From cbc4b0418cddb577002305112399f0d869087c88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Breno Matheus Lima Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 19:29:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] doc: imx: habv4: Add HABv4 introduction The HABv4 is supported in i.MX50, i.MX53, i.MX6, i.MX7, series and i.MX 8M, i.MX8MM devices. Add an introductory document containing the following topics: - HABv4 Introduction - HABv4 Secure Boot - HABv4 Encrypted Boot - HAB PKI tree generation - HAB Fast Authentication PKI tree generation - SRK Table and SRK Hash generation Reviewed-by: Ye Li Reviewed-by: Utkarsh Gupta Signed-off-by: Breno Lima --- doc/imx/habv4/introduction_habv4.txt | 262 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 262 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/imx/habv4/introduction_habv4.txt diff --git a/doc/imx/habv4/introduction_habv4.txt b/doc/imx/habv4/introduction_habv4.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25711bbe95 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/imx/habv4/introduction_habv4.txt @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ + +=======================================================+ + + i.MX Secure and Encrypted Boot using HABv4 + + +=======================================================+ + +1. Introduction +---------------- + +The i.MX family of applications processors provides the High Assurance Boot +(HAB) feature in the on-chip ROM. The ROM is responsible for loading the +initial program image (U-Boot) from the boot media and HAB enables the ROM +to authenticate and/or decrypt the program image by using cryptography +operations. + +This feature is supported in i.MX 50, i.MX 53, i.MX 6, i.MX 7 series and + i.MX 8M, i.MX 8MM devices. + +Step-by-step guides are available under doc/imx/habv4/guides/ directory, +users familiar with HAB and CST PKI tree generation should refer to these +documents instead. + +1.1 The HABv4 Secure Boot Architecture +--------------------------------------- + +The HABv4 secure boot feature uses digital signatures to prevent unauthorized +software execution during the device boot sequence. In case a malware takes +control of the boot sequence, sensitive data, services and network can be +impacted. + +The HAB authentication is based on public key cryptography using the RSA +algorithm in which image data is signed offline using a series of private +keys. The resulting signed image data is then verified on the i.MX processor +using the corresponding public keys. The public keys are included in the CSF +binary and the SRK Hash is programmed in the SoC fuses for establishing the +root of trust. + +The diagram below illustrate the secure boot process overview: + + Host PC + CST i.MX + HAB + +----------+ +----------+ + ---> | U-Boot | | Compare | + | +----------+ +----------+ + | | ^ ^ + | v Reference / \ Generated + | +----------+ Hash / \ Hash + | | Hash | Private / \ + | +----------+ Key / \ + | | | +----------+ +----------+ + | v | | Verify | | Hash | + | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ + | | Sign | <--- SRK ^ ^ + | +----------+ HASH \ / + | | | CSF \ / U-Boot + | v v \ / + | +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ + | | U-Boot | | | | U-Boot | + ---> | + | -----> | i.MX | -----> | + | + | CSF | | | | CSF | + +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ + +The U-Boot image to be programmed into the boot media needs to be properly +constructed i.e. it must contain a proper Command Sequence File (CSF). + +The CSF is a binary data structure interpreted by the HAB to guide +authentication process, this is generated by the Code Signing Tool[1]. +The CSF structure contains the commands, SRK table, signatures and +certificates. + +Details about the Secure Boot and Code Signing Tool (CST) can be found in +the application note AN4581[2] and in the secure boot guides. + +1.2 The HABv4 Encrypted Boot Architecture +------------------------------------------ + +The HAB Encrypted Boot feature available in CAAM supported devices adds an +extra security operation to the bootloading sequence. It uses cryptographic +techniques (AES-CCM) to obscure the U-Boot data, so it cannot be seen or used +by unauthorized users. This mechanism protects the U-Boot code residing on +flash or external memory and also ensures that the final image is unique +per device. + +The process can be divided into two protection mechanisms. The first mechanism +is the bootloader code encryption which provides data confidentiality and the +second mechanism is the digital signature, which authenticates the encrypted +image. + +Keep in mind that the encrypted boot makes use of both mechanisms whatever the +order is (sign and then encrypt, or encrypt and then sign), both operations +can be applied on the same region with exception of the U-Boot Header (IVT, +boot data and DCD) which can only be signed, not encrypted. + +The diagram below illustrate the encrypted boot process overview: + + Host PC + CST i.MX + HAB + +------------+ +--------------+ + | U-Boot | | U-Boot | + +------------+ +--------------+ + | ^ + | | + v DEK +--------------+ + +------------+ | ----> | Decrypt | + | Encrypt | <--- | +--------------+ + +------------+ DEK | ^ + | | | + | Private | | + v Key +------+ +--------------+ + +------------+ | | CAAM | | Authenticate | + | Sign | <--- +------+ +--------------+ + +------------+ DEK ^ ^ + | + OTPMK DEK \ / U-Boot + | | Blob \ / + CSF + v v \ / + +------------+ +----------+ +------------+ + | Enc U-Boot | | | | Enc U-Boot | + | + CSF | ----> | i.MX | -------> | + CSF | + | + DEK Blob | | | | + DEK Blob | + +------------+ +----------+ +------------+ + ^ | + | | + --------------------- + DEK Blob + (CAAM) + +The Code Signing Tool automatically generates a random AES Data Encryption Key +(DEK) when encrypting an image. This key is used in both encrypt and decrypt +operations and should be present in the final image structure encapsulated +by a CAAM blob. + +The OTP Master Key (OTPMK) is used to encrypt and wrap the DEK in a blob +structure. The OTPMK is unique per device and can be accessed by CAAM only. +To further add to the security of the DEK, the blob is decapsulated and +decrypted inside a secure memory partition that can only be accessed by CAAM. + +During the design of encrypted boot using DEK blob, it is necessary to inhibit +any modification or replacement of DEK blob with a counterfeit one allowing +execution of malicious code. The PRIBLOB setting in CAAM allows secure boot +software to have its own private blobs that cannot be decapsulated or +encapsulated by any other user code, including any software running in trusted +mode. + +Details about DEK Blob generation and PRIBLOB setting can be found in the +encrypted boot guide and application note AN12056[3] . + +2. Generating a PKI tree +------------------------- + +The first step is to generate the private keys and public keys certificates. +The HAB architecture is based in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) tree. + +The Code Signing Tools package contains an OpenSSL based key generation script +under keys/ directory. The hab4_pki_tree.sh script is able to generate a PKI +tree containing up to 4 Super Root Keys (SRK) as well as their subordinated +IMG and CSF keys. + +A new PKI tree can be generated by following the example below: + +- Generating 2048-bit PKI tree on CST v3.1.0: + + $ ./hab4_pki_tree.sh + ... + Do you want to use an existing CA key (y/n)?: n + Do you want to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (y/n)?: n + Enter key length in bits for PKI tree: 2048 + Enter PKI tree duration (years): 5 + How many Super Root Keys should be generated? 4 + Do you want the SRK certificates to have the CA flag set? (y/n)?: y + +The diagram below illustrate the PKI tree: + + +---------+ + | CA | + +---------+ + | + | + --------------------------------------------------- + | | | | + | | | | + v v v v + +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ + | SRK1 | | SRK2 | | SRK3 | | SRK4 | + +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ + / \ / \ / \ / \ + v v v v v v v v + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ + |CSF1| |IMG1| |CSF2| |IMG2| |CSF3| |IMG3| |CSF4| |IMG4| + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ + +After running the script users can check the private keys under keys/ directory +and their respective X.509v3 public key certificates under crts/ directory. +Those files will be used during the signing and authentication process. + +2.1 Generating a fast authentication PKI tree +---------------------------------------------- + +Starting in HAB v4.1.2 users can use a single SRK key to authenticate the both +CSF and IMG contents. This reduces the number of key pair authentications that +must occur during the ROM/HAB boot stage, thus providing a faster boot process. + +The script hab4_pki_tree.sh is also able to generate a Public Key Infrastructure +(PKI) tree which only contains SRK Keys, users should not set the CA flag when +generating the SRK certificates. + +- Generating 2048-bit fast authentication PKI tree on CST v3.1.0: + + $ ./hab4_pki_tree.sh + ... + Do you want to use an existing CA key (y/n)?: n + Do you want to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (y/n)?: n + Enter key length in bits for PKI tree: 2048 + Enter PKI tree duration (years): 5 + How many Super Root Keys should be generated? 4 + Do you want the SRK certificates to have the CA flag set? (y/n)?: n + +The diagram below illustrate the PKI tree generated: + + +---------+ + | CA | + +---------+ + | + | + --------------------------------------------------- + | | | | + | | | | + v v v v + +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ + | SRK1 | | SRK2 | | SRK3 | | SRK4 | + +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ + +2.2 Generating a SRK Table and SRK Hash +---------------------------------------- + +The next step is to generated the SRK Table and its respective SRK Table Hash +from the SRK public key certificates created in one of the steps above. + +In the HAB architecture, the SRK Table is included in the CSF binary and the +SRK Hash is programmed in the SoC SRK_HASH[255:0] fuses. + +On the target device during the authentication process the HAB code verify the +SRK Table against the SoC SRK_HASH fuses, in case the verification success the +root of trust is established and the HAB code can progress with the image +authentication. + +The srktool can be used for generating the SRK Table and its respective SRK +Table Hash. + +- Generating SRK Table and SRK Hash in Linux 64-bit machines: + + $ ../linux64/bin/srktool -h 4 -t SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin -e \ + SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin -d sha256 -c \ + SRK1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca_crt.pem,\ + SRK2_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca_crt.pem,\ + SRK3_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca_crt.pem,\ + SRK4_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca_crt.pem + +The SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin and SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin files can be used in further +steps as explained in HAB guides available under doc/imx/habv4/guides/ +directory. + +References: +[1] CST: i.MX High Assurance Boot Reference Code Signing Tool. +[2] AN4581: "Secure Boot on i.MX 50, i.MX 53, i.MX 6 and i.MX 7 Series using + HABv4" - Rev 2. +[3] AN12056: "Encrypted Boot on HABv4 and CAAM Enabled Devices" - Rev. 1 -- 2.39.5