From 201b8068f35385c1c7794f24d0a3ac427210f241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:07 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] efi_loader: Make the pkcs7 header parsing function an extern The pkcs7 header parsing functionality is pretty generic, and can be used by other features like capsule authentication. Make the function an extern, also changing it's name to efi_parse_pkcs7_header Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- include/efi_loader.h | 4 ++ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 93 ++-------------------------------- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index 790d4bf64c..f1dfb1d33f 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -820,6 +820,10 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); +struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf, + size_t buflen, + u8 **tmpbuf); + /* runtime implementation of memcpy() */ void efi_memcpy_runtime(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n); diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index 79dee27421..9ab071b611 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -27,6 +27,91 @@ const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { + /* SEQUENCE */ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, + /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */ + 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, + /* Context Structured? */ + 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8, +}; + +/** + * efi_parse_pkcs7_header - parse a signature in payload + * @buf: Pointer to payload's value + * @buflen: Length of @buf + * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer + * + * Parse a signature embedded in payload's value and instantiate + * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only + * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly + * parsing authentication data + * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be + * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer + * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify(). + * + * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error + */ +struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf, + size_t buflen, + u8 **tmpbuf) +{ + u8 *ebuf; + size_t ebuflen, len; + struct pkcs7_message *msg; + + /* + * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is + * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData. + */ + if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) && + !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) { + msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen); + if (IS_ERR(msg)) + return NULL; + return msg; + } + + /* + * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7 + * message parser to be able to process. + * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data() + * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c + * TODO: + * The header should be composed in a more refined manner. + */ + EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n"); + ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen; + if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) { + EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n"); + return NULL; + } + + ebuf = malloc(ebuflen); + if (!ebuf) { + EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n"); + return NULL; + } + + memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr)); + memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen); + len = ebuflen - 4; + ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + ebuf[3] = len & 0xff; + len = ebuflen - 0x13; + ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff; + + msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen); + + if (IS_ERR(msg)) { + free(ebuf); + return NULL; + } + + *tmpbuf = ebuf; + return msg; +} /** * efi_hash_regions - calculate a hash value diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c index 0c689cfb47..ba0874e9e7 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c @@ -24,91 +24,6 @@ #include #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT -static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { - /* SEQUENCE */ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, - /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */ - 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, - /* Context Structured? */ - 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8, -}; - -/** - * efi_variable_parse_signature - parse a signature in variable - * @buf: Pointer to variable's value - * @buflen: Length of @buf - * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer - * - * Parse a signature embedded in variable's value and instantiate - * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only - * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly - * parsing authentication data, particularly for variable's. - * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be - * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer - * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify(). - * - * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error - */ -static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf, - size_t buflen, - u8 **tmpbuf) -{ - u8 *ebuf; - size_t ebuflen, len; - struct pkcs7_message *msg; - - /* - * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is - * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData. - */ - if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) && - !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) { - msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen); - if (IS_ERR(msg)) - return NULL; - return msg; - } - - /* - * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7 - * message parser to be able to process. - * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data() - * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c - * TODO: - * The header should be composed in a more refined manner. - */ - EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n"); - ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen; - if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) { - EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n"); - return NULL; - } - - ebuf = malloc(ebuflen); - if (!ebuf) { - EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n"); - return NULL; - } - - memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr)); - memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen); - len = ebuflen - 4; - ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; - ebuf[3] = len & 0xff; - len = ebuflen - 0x13; - ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; - ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff; - - msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen); - - if (IS_ERR(msg)) { - free(ebuf); - return NULL; - } - - *tmpbuf = ebuf; - return msg; -} /** * efi_variable_authenticate - authenticate a variable @@ -215,10 +130,10 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable, goto err; /* ebuf should be kept valid during the authentication */ - var_sig = efi_variable_parse_signature(auth->auth_info.cert_data, - auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength - - sizeof(auth->auth_info), - &ebuf); + var_sig = efi_parse_pkcs7_header(auth->auth_info.cert_data, + auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength + - sizeof(auth->auth_info), + &ebuf); if (!var_sig) { EFI_PRINT("Parsing variable's signature failed\n"); goto err; -- 2.39.5